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ABSTRACT 
As the information age continues to evolve and technological expansion persists in 
creating a marked footprint across the four corners of the world, the need arises to protect 
our prized assets from potential adversarial motives.  The extant threat to cyberspace 
necessitates the need to aptly man, train, and equip our forces to ably combat any 
untoward incidents.  The Naval Postgraduate School with its very diverse population 
presents an exact medium to develop this next generation of warriors skilled in the field 
of Cyber Warfare to project both offensively and defensively against any contingent 
threat.  As its mission statement professes: 
NPS strives to provide relevant and unique advanced education and 
research to increase the combat effectiveness and enhance the security of 
the United States. 
This thesis will leverage current instructions to bridge the gap and focus on 
providing a Concept of Operations for the Center for Cyber Warfare that aligns with the 
Chief of Naval Operations’ (CNO) Strategic Focus Areas.  This thesis will additionally 
recommend an architectural framework that addresses the current issues within the cyber 
domain and/or will allow for future expansion of the NPS mission datasets deemed of 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
This Concept of Operations (CONOP) document provides a functional overview of the 
Center for Cyber Warfare (CCW).  The CCW is envisioned as a joint research venture 
between the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) and various military, national, and 
industry sponsors including—United States Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM); United 
States Fleet Cyber Command (FLTCYBERCOM)/10th Fleet; the National Security 
Agency/Central Security Service (NSA/CSS); Department of Homeland Security (DHS); 
National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA); Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA); 
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA); and the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) to 
name a few.  Additionally, through planned academic partnerships with the University of 
Southern California (USC) and nine other accredited universities, NPS will participate in 
an outreach program to educate and train future cadres of cyber warfare professionals.  
The CCW is NPS’s premier site for education, research, and the development of full 
spectrum cyberspace operational capabilities across all domains.  The CCW intent is to 
operate in direct support of the NPS stated mission by providing the tools to facilitate 
higher learning of civilians and military officers, and produce the knowledge, technology, 
and techniques needed by the U.S. and its allied forces to further enhance national 
security and global initiatives. 
The CCW will accomplish this by performing three major functions: 
• Producing military officers and civilians that are technically educated and 
gain expertise in the cyber warfare related disciplines of networks, 
cryptology/signals intelligence (SIGINT), information operations (IO), 
cyber, electronic warfare (EW), and space via in residence work and/or 
distance learning. 
• Conducting advanced technical research at the undergraduate and 
postgraduate levels utilizing the Student Outreach and/or Science, 
Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics (STEM) Program in addition 
to NPS associate faculty and Staff guidance. 
• Producing guided written theses and technical reports and furthering 
advancement of cyber techniques applicable for operational use enhancing 
radio frequency (RF) spectrum dominance (Knorr, 2010). 
 xxii
This CONOP further details the mission of the CCW and the competency areas it 
will maintain, defines the supporting and supported relationships, and describes the 
material and personnel requirements needed to accomplish the mission.  An appendix to 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
I’M THE CREEPER–CATCH ME IF YOU CAN… 
Imagine, this very phrase replicating itself as it infected multiple host computers.  
Derived from what would eventually be known as the first “computer virus,” labeled the 
“Creeper” code, it was created by engineers from Bolt, Beranek, and Newman (BBN) 
Technologies, and deployed not as a malicious code, but rather as an experimental self-
replicating program that intrinsically could be brought back to its normal state by a 
corresponding program named Reaper.  While the importance of being able to replicate 
and repair was the focal point of the experiment, insight and research into the likely 
consequences and/or future advent of a new era—particularly that of analogous intrusive 
software programs that could be introduced into a network by an adversary and possibly 
pose a great threat to society and national security may well have been a worthwhile 
initiative to follow.  And while these concerns for security might not have been readily 
apparent at the time, most likely due to fact that in 1970 the systems all existed on the 
closed network architecture Advanced Research Projects Agency Network (ARPANET), 
the predecessor to what we know today as the Internet, our reliance on such technology 
presents the case that it is an issue worthy for consideration. 
Case in point, data obtained from open source documentation shows a dramatic 
upward trend from 360,985,492 to 1,966,514,816 of total Internet users worldwide that 
equates to approximately a 444.8% increase in users since December 2000 (Internet 
World Stats, 2010)! 
The exponential rate at which these numbers continue to propagate, coupled with 
the progressive ephemeralization of technology, has led us down the path where we now 
find ourselves facing challenges such as the rapid depletion of available Internet Protocol 
version 4 (IPv4) addresses, bandwidth allocation, the transition to the next generation 
data networks, and pervasive threats such as Internet security and database breaches, to 
include malicious software (malware) attacks and similar vulnerabilities. 
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The significance of the problem is so pronounced that following the 9-11 attack 
and more importantly Wall Street Journal’s (WSJ) disclosure that terrorists had infiltrated 
the U.S. power grid and planted malicious code to disrupt the grid, then President George 
W. Bush ordered the development of National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 16 
Guidelines for Offensive Cyber-Warfare (Bush, 2002).  Open source reporting indicates 
the directive provides National-level guidance and addresses when and how the United 
States would launch cyber-attacks against enemy computer networks (Carvalho & da 
Silva, 2009, p. 12).  Promulgation of directives such as NSPD 54 and Homeland Security 
Presidential Directive (HSPD) 23 on “Cyber Security and Monitoring” further identified 
the preventative measures being undertaken to secure the cyber environment (Bush, 
2008). 
Additionally, President Barak Obama more recently called for a complete review 
of the National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace and the Comprehensive National 
Cybersecurity Initiative (CNCI).  The final CNCI assessment specified the following key 
lines of reasoning: 
• Establishment of a front line of defense from imminent threats through 
creation or enhancement of shared situational awareness of network 
vulnerabilities, threats, and events within the Federal Government—and 
ultimately with state, local, and tribal governments and private sector 
partners. 
• Defense from full spectrum threats by enhancing U.S. counterintelligence 
capabilities and increasing the security of the supply chain for key 
information technologies. 
• Strengthen cyber security domain by sustaining cyber education. (Obama, 
2010) 
The wheels have already been set in motion to operationally accomplish these 
objectives from the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) to the CNO through administrative 
action and establishment of commands that will forge ahead in achieving the required 
cyberspace effects at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war. 
At the time of this writing, per SECDEF direction United States Strategic 
Command (USSTRATCOM) headed by General (Gen) Kevin Chilton established United 
States Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM) with GEN Keith Alexander assuming the role 
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of sub-unified commander.  This in turn spearheaded the formation of specific service 
components, namely—Army Forces Cyber Command (ARFORCYBER) supported by 
NETCOM/9th Signal Command, 1st Information Operations Command, and Intelligence 
and Security Command; 24th United States Air Force supported by the 688th Information 
Operations Wing (IOW) and 67th Network Warfare Wing (NWW), United States Fleet 
Cyber Command (FLTCYBERCOM); and Marine Corps Forces Cyber Command 
(MARFORCYBER) each of which have been duly charged to sustain cyber operation 
and defense of networks across the multidimensional battlespace. 
To drive home the point, Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) ADM Roughead 
further elucidated: 
The opening rounds of the next war will be in cyberspace—the Navy must 
be ready to prevent wars as well as win them; to that, we must understand 
how we will live, operate and win in cyberspace. 
To endorse this, during Fiscal Year (FY) 2010 several key initiatives evolved.  
Late 2009 witnessed the consolidation of the Chief of Naval Operations (OPNAV) 
N2/N6 staff and its shift of focus from a platform centric approach to integration of 
information intensive programs and capabilities, namely—intelligence, surveillance, and 
reconnaissance (ISR); electronic warfare (EW); information warfare (IW); cyber; 
maritime domain awareness (MDA); networks; Command, Control, Communications, 
and Computers (C4); space; unmanned resources; and oceanography all under one 
umbrella.  In January 2010, United States Fleet Cyber Command / Tenth Fleet 
(FLTCYBERCOM/10th Flt) was established as the U.S. Navy’s component command 
responsible for cyber operations.  Finally, to strengthen the number of cyber professionals 
and the Navy’s ability to provide decision superiority to the warfighter the Information 
Dominance Corps (IDC) was established.  Focusing on unity of effort and the capacity to 
direct a cadre of officers, enlisted, and their civilian counterparts, the IDC integrates 
Information Professional (IP), Information Warfare (IW), Naval Intelligence, and 
Oceanography, Space Cadre officers, Cyber Warfare Engineers; and Aviation 
Aerographers Mate (AG), Cryptologic Technician (CT), Intelligence Specialist (IS), and 
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Information Technician (IT) enlisted personnel; and civilians with the Navy Defense 
Civilian Intelligence Program to efficiently deliver information and decision superiority 
across the cyber environment. 
To more clearly understand the concept of information dominance in the cyber 
domain, one must ask what exactly is cyberspace and how might war be waged in such 
an environment?  Joint Publication (JP) 1-02 defines cyberspace as: 
A global domain within the information environment consisting of the 
interdependent network of information technology infrastructures, 
including the Internet, telecommunications networks, computer systems, 
and embedded processors and controllers. 
A more concise description would be that defined by Webster as: 
The online world of computer networks and especially the Internet. 
(Cyberspace, 2010) 
The Information Age has brought us to the point wherein globally people have 
shifted reliance on computing technology and the Internet as the foundation for enabling 
its economic, political, social, business, and military sectors.  While the cyber 
infrastructure might perceptibly be more observable and evolutionary in terms of 
increased productivity, efficiency, and modernization; dependence on these systems 
presents links to potential security vulnerabilities risks as well as offers undue resilience 
to cyber attacks backed by state and non-state actors. 
Cyber attacks in this case references: 
Deliberate actions to alter, disrupt, deceive, degrade, or destroy computer 
systems or networks or the information and/or programs resident in or 
transiting these systems or networks. (Owens, Dam, & Lin, 2009) 
Figure 1 provides a graphical representation of the evolution of a standard cyber 
attack process.  Five sequential escalatory processes define the initiation of a cyber 
attack. 
• Phase I reconnaissance involves covert collection of information on an 
unknowing subject either through Web based methods or social 
engineering tactics. 
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• Phase II scanning performs a broad range of network mapping that assists 
in identifying security flaws or vulnerabilities in networks thus allowing 
the adversary access to and potential compromise of systems. 
• Phase III or unauthorized access to systems utilizing password guessing 
techniques and vulnerability exploitation tools stems from software and 
hardware design flaws, improper security administration and application 
of incorrect network management procedures. 
• Phase IV or malicious activity refers to those actions that constitute a 
threat to network or computer systems and includes actions such as data 
deletion, theft, alteration, and storing of malware on an unsuspecting 
user’s computer. 
• All previous phases culminate with Phase V, the exploitation of such data 
and ability of these attackers to use this information to their advantage in 
an illegitimate manner. 
 
Figure 1.   Standard Cyber Attack Process (From Technolytics, 2009) 
Instances of historical attacks that utilized similar attack patterns in the cyber 
domain and have geographical-strategic implications include the following: 
• Israeli penetration of Syrian Command and Control (C2) systems. 
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Under a cloak of darkness, Israeli fighters targeted a Syrian construction site that 
was believed to contain or process nuclear material.  What was interesting in this incident 
was Israel’s ability to penetrate the active Syrian air defense systems unnoticed.  This has 
led to speculations that Israel currently possesses advanced technology to disrupt an 
adversary’s Command and Control (C2) at will.  Analysis of this particular attack 
attributes that through the application of light and electromagnetic pulses Israel 
transmitted 1s and 0s that effectively masked their tracks on Syrian defense systems 
(Clarke & Knake, 2010, p. 1–8). 
• Russian attack on Estonia's infrastructure. 
In the case of Estonia, longstanding tensions between the locals and ethnic 
Russians and the Bronze Night incident escalated to a suspected Russian attack on their 
network infrastructure.  What is interesting to note is that Estonia ranks high on the list of 
the most interconnected or wired nations in the world.  Utilizing a distributed denial of 
service (DDoS) attack, servers were flooded with Internet traffic that crashed and shut 
down multiple Internet services such as e-commerce, government, and broadcasting sites 
(Clarke & Knake, 2010, p.12–13). 
• The synchronized campaign against the country of Georgia. 
In 2008, Georgia experienced similar DDoS attacks on their government sites 
during the Georgia-Russia conflict.  The fact that their nodes and routers ran through 
Russia and Turkey effectively shut Georgia off from the outside world but more 
importantly it crippled Georgia’s banking and financial sector (Clarke & Knake, 2010, 
p.17–21). 
• The "Ghostnet Project" that uncovered a large-scale cyber spying 
operation with nodes tracing back to the People's Republic of China. 
Ghostnet, which spanned 103 countries and infected approximately 2,000 
workstations, was of particular significance due to the fact that the targeted computers 
resided in foreign embassies.  Ghostnet had the ability to initiate data and file-capture and 
remote activation of audio-visual devices so the attacker could eavesdrop on discussions 
particularly those related to Tibetan issues (Delbert & Rohozinski, 2009). 
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• The recent cyber attack against Google coined “Operation Aurora.” 
From December 2009 to January 2010, China was accused of executing malicious 
attacks against Google and 20 high profile organizations.  The incident received 
worldwide attention and led to Google’s review of business relations with China and 
subsequent request for attack analysis by cyber experts from the National Security 
Agency (NSA) (Higgins, 2010). 
From the preceding examples one can infer that the volatile nature of the cyber 
environment and the potential expansion of cyber attacks calls for a more proactive role 
in ensuring the U.S. remain at the forefront in research and development, education, and 
training of a cyber cadre.  In adopting the above directives and in support of operational 
requirements identified by the recently incepted Cyber Commands, the CCW thus intends 
to recruit, groom, educate, and invest in a technically adept and cleared cyber workforce 
to revolutionize the objective of Information Dominance. 
A. BACKGROUND 
The area of research for this thesis includes a review of past, current, and 
preliminary and/or draft documents pertaining to cyberspace policy.  This thesis builds on 
these strategies and in accordance with the Naval Postgraduate School’s mission and 
functional requirements, applies these concepts by way of a proposed CONOP for the 
CCW.  Additionally, this thesis addresses requisite CCW cyber infrastructure 
requirements to generate a more robust experimentation and testing environment. 
B. OBJECTIVES 
In more specific terms, the objectives of this thesis were to: 
• Define the current cyberspace environment to include the key 
stakeholders from both government and private sectors. 
• Develop the foundation for the establishment of a center focused 
on key cyber warfare mission sets while capitalizing on supporting 
and piloting emerging technologies. 
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C. STATEMENT OF PROBLEM 
Reliance on information technology initially, as a medium for exchange of 
unclassified scientific research, has evolved to a more complex network architecture that 
connects millions of computers on a global scale, supporting numerous business services 
and functionalities.  To respond, to reduce our vulnerability, and to minimize damage and 
downtime associated with potential adversary and malicious cyber attacks, we need a 
more comprehensive strategy that addresses cyber security and cultivates training and 
education for the next generation cyber force. 
Key research questions addressed include: 
• What is cyber warfare? 
• Who are the key stakeholders in this discipline? 
• What is the proposed CONOP for the Center for Cyber Warfare? 
• How do we develop an architectural framework that can capture 
changes and future expansion of the center? 
D. SCOPE, LIMITATIONS, AND ASSUMPTIONS 
The scope of this thesis was limited to analyzing and developing a CONOP for 
the Cyber Warfare Center because: 
• Specific mission capabilities and requirements for the CCW have 
not been fully defined. 
• Research Principal Investigators (PI) need to ensure CCW 
establishes a service oriented architecture (SOA) framework to 
fully support collaboration and engagement with other universities, 
research centers, laboratories, and applicable agencies. 
• Recommendations for an extensible and flexible architecture 
guarantees more efficient and cost effective use of resources. 
E. METHODOLOGY AND ORGANIZATION 
The research method incorporated a review of existing policy documents and 
material pertaining to cyber warfare and information dominance.  It additionally involved 
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assisting the CCW Tiger Team in gathering requirements particularly the scope of work 
for the facility and the server room and the equipment list for the CCW laboratory and 
administrative spaces as well as the server room. 
The succeeding chapters will discuss the CONOP, provide an architectural 
framework, and submit recommendations and conclusions for the CCW. 
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II. PROPOSED CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS—CENTER FOR 
CYBER WARFARE 
A. MISSION AND VISION 
In consonance with explicitly stated national, strategic, and operational guidance, 
and under the auspices of the Naval Postgraduate School, the Center for Cyber Warfare 
(CCW) provides a full spectrum graduate-level facility that enables seminal research, 
formal education, and rigorous training to properly equip the future United States 
Department of Defense and public sector cyber workforce in the disciplines of 
intelligence, information operations, and cyber domains. 
CCW’s objective is to earn recognition as the premier Center for Excellence in 
Cyber Warfare and Academic Excellence in Research. 
B. KEY STAKEHOLDERS 
Organizational theory elucidates that the goals and activities of an enterprise 
determines its organizational structure (Bothamley, 2002).  The agency Program 
Managers and Service Components specified below influence the strategic learning of the 
CCW wherein coordination, cooperation, and the transferability of knowledge across 
multiple levels enables and supports the CCW’s stated mission and its ability to discover, 
explore, and educate to emergent technology in the cyber environment. 
1. Director of National Intelligence (DNI) 
Among other functions, the DNI is:  
Head of the Intelligence Community (IC), overseeing and directing the 
implementation of the National Intelligence Program and Policy, and 
acting as the principal advisor to the President, the National Security 
Council, and the Homeland Security Council for intelligence matters 
related to the National Security.  Working together with the Principal 
Deputy DNI (PDDNI) and with the assistance of Mission Managers and 
four Deputy Directors, the Office of the DNI's goal is to effectively 
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integrate foreign, military, and domestic intelligence in defense of the 
homeland and of United States interests abroad. (Director of National 
Intelligence Mission Statement, 2010) 
Currently, 16 intelligence agencies fall under the purview of the DNI.  Each 
intelligence activity is responsible for a particular intelligence discipline - open source 
intelligence (OSINT), human intelligence (HUMINT), measurement and signals 
intelligence (MASINT), imagery intelligence (IMINT), geospatial intelligence 
(GEOINT), and signals intelligence (SIGINT).  Collection techniques utilized by each of 
these agencies varies slightly therefore voluntary pooling of data and information from 
these agencies supports information dominance initiatives by providing a more 
comprehensive picture of the current battle space.  This in turn reduces duplication of 
effort and allows for more efficient tasking of available resources. 
To elucidate this point, Table 1 derived from congressional testimonies, mission 
statements, and known capabilities, provides estimates on each agency’s current 
processes and technologies and their ability to sustain cyber focused operations.  On a 
scale of 1 signifying the low end and 5 at the high end, the ratings convey the relevance 
and progression of current capabilities with respect to cyber intelligence gathering. 
 
Table 1.   Cyber Intelligence Capabilities (From Technolytics, 2009) 
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2. Department of Defense (DoD) 
The responsibilities and oversight of the national cyber mission sets is enabled by 
multiple service elements and specific agencies identified in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2.   Organizational Chart (From IP Symposium, 2010) 
a. Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) 
In his administrative capacity, the CNO is: 
Responsible to the Secretary of the Navy (SECNAV) for the command, 
utilization of resources, and operating efficiency of the operating forces of 
the Navy and of the Navy shore activities assigned by the Secretary. (CNO 
Mission Statement, 2010) 
From a cyber perspective, direction provided by the CNO included 
merging of the Chief of Naval Operations (OPNAV) N2/N6 staff to enable integration 
and innovation of war fighting capabilities, establishment of United States Fleet Cyber 
Command/10th Fleet to handle operational cyber requirements, realignment of Naval 
Network Command (NAVNETWARCOM) for execution of network and space 
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operations, and establishment of Cyber Forces Command (CYBERFOR) to manage 
manning, training, and equipping requirements as depicted in Figure 2. 
b. National Security Agency/Central Security Service (NSA/CSS) 
NSA/CSS is the lead defense agency for SIGINT related operations within 
the DoD and additionally is: 
The U.S. Government (USG) lead for cryptology, and its mission 
encompasses both Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) and Information 
Assurance (IA) activities.  The CSS conducts SIGINT collection, 
processing, analysis, production, and dissemination, and other cryptologic 
operations as assigned by the Director, NSA/Chief, CSS 
(DIRNSA/CHCSS). (NSA/CSS Mission Statement, 2010) 
As depicted earlier in Table 1, NSA scored high marks in its current 
capabilities and as such will remain the most likely organization to lead national cyber 
related missions.  That being said, forging a strong relationship via the resident NSA/CSS 
Chair addressed in Chapter II Section C will ensure the CCW focuses on research, 
training, and education pertinent to current and future requirements. 
c. United States Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM) 
The mission of USCYBERCOM is: 
To coordinate computer network defense and direct U.S. cyber attack 
operations. (USCYBERCOM Mission Statement, 2010) 
Referencing Figure 3, the establishment of USCYBERCOM bears with it 
the formation of a dual-hatted position.  On June 2010, GEN Alexander, the incumbent 
director of the National Security Agency was appointed Commander for 
USCYBERCOM operations.  Based on this construct, under Title 10 of the U.S. code 
GEN Alexander will direct actions that pertains to military cyber operations and under 
Title 50 of the U.S. code he additionally has responsibility for intelligence operations as it 




legality issues of closely tying the means and ways together, it increases the breadth of 
intellectual and research opportunities the U.S. and institutions such as NPS gains in the 
realm of information dominance. 
 
Figure 3.   USCYBERCOM Organization (From Van Houten, 2010) 
d. United States Fleet Cyber Command (FLTCYBERCOM) 
FLTCYBERCOM is the operational arm of the U.S. Navy cyber mission 
with responsibility: 
To direct Navy cyberspace operations globally to deter and defeat 
aggression and to ensure freedom of action to achieve military objectives 
in and through cyberspace; to organize and direct Navy cryptologic 
operations worldwide and support information operations and space 
planning and operations, as directed; to direct, operate, maintain, secure, 
and defend the Navy’s portion of the Global Information Grid; to deliver 
integrated cyber, information operations, cryptologic, and space 
capabilities; and to deliver global Navy cyber network common cyber 
operational requirement. (FLTCYBERCOM Mission Statement, 2010) 
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e. United States 10th Fleet (C10F) 
Co-located with FLTCYBERCOM, Tenth fleet controls the operational 
forces that support the Navy cyber mission of: 
Serving as the Number Fleet for FLTCYBERCOM and exercise 
operational control of assigned Naval forces; to coordinate with other 
naval, Coalition, and Joint Task Forces (JTF) to execute the full spectrum 
of cyber, electronic warfare, information operations, and signal 
intelligence capabilities and missions across the cyber, electromagnetic, 
and space domain. (Tenth Fleet Mission Statement, 2010) 
Figure 4 details the key operational and geographical areas to which CCW 
can align ECE Cyber and EW certificate and degree programs.  To sustain the 
cryptologic, network operations (NETOPS), computer network operation (CNO), and 
information operations functionalities CCW can provide graduate level research and 
education focused on SIGINT; cyber; space; information operations (IO); electronic 
warfare (EW); networks; computer systems; digital communications; signal processing; 
and guidance, navigation, and control. 
 
Figure 4.   C10F Task Organization (From C10F, 2010) 
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3. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 
The mission of DHS is three-fold: 
(1) To lead the unified national effort to secure America; (2) prevent and 
deter terrorist attacks and protect against and respond to threats and 
hazards to the Nation; and (3) secure our national borders while 
welcoming lawful immigrants, visitors, and trade. (DHS Mission 
Statement, 2010) 
In this respect, CCW can further its strong ties with DHS and the NPS Center for 
Homeland Security and Defense (CHDS) by promoting educational opportunities and 
training programs that support the overarching National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace 
and by furthering research initiatives aimed at reducing vulnerabilities of national and 
military infrastructures. 
Based on more recent dialogues with DHS, CCW will respond with an 
interdisciplinary proposal for certificates that address the roles and competencies outlined 
in the IT Essential Body of Knowledge (EBK) document dated September 2008 (Knorr, 
2010).  The IT Security EBK is a document developed by the Department of Homeland 
Security National Cyber Security Division (DHS-NCSD) that offers an overarching 
document that links competencies and functional perspectives to IT security roles filled 
by personnel in both public and private sectors.  The potential benefit the EBK brings is 
two-fold – (1) it articulates IT functions in a more context-neutral format and language 
and (2) provides content that facilitates efficiencies in academic curricula and related 
activities.  To ensure the EBK remains relevant and applicable to the current environment 
it is maintained as a living document with revisions incorporated every two years.  Of the 
14 competency areas identified in the EBK, the ECE department will focus on the 
following: 
• Data Security—principles, policies, and procedures necessary to ensure 
the confidentiality, integrity, availability, and privacy of data in all forms 
of media.  Terms associated with data security include—access control, 




• Digital Forensics—acquiring, validating, and analyzing electronic data to 
reconstruct events related to security.  Terms associated with digital 
forensics include—cyber laws/guidelines/policies, e-discovery, network 
forensics, network monitoring, etc. 
• Network and Telecommunications Security—principles, policies, and 
procedures involved in ensuring the security of basic network and 
telecommunications services and data, and maintaining the hardware layer 
on which it resides.  Terms associated with network security include—
network segmentation, encryption technologies, defense in depth, 
networking models and protocols, etc. 
• System and Application Security—principles, policies, and procedures 
pertaining to integrating information security into an IT system or 
application during the system development life cycle (SDLC).  Terms 
associated with system and application security include—security testing 
and evaluation, configuration management, secure coding, secure system 
design, etc. (DHS, 2008) 
4. National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) 
NGA provides key geospatial assets to support the U.S. cyber mission.  As its 
mission statement professes: 
NGA provides timely, relevant, and accurate geospatial intelligence in 
support of national security objectives. “geospatial intelligence” 
(GEOINT) is the exploitation and analysis of imagery and geospatial 
information to describe, assess, and visually depict physical features and 
geographically referenced activities on the Earth.  Geospatial intelligence 
consists of imagery, imagery intelligence, and geospatial (e.g., mapping, 
charting, and geodesy) information. (NGA Mission Statement, 2010) 
Through NGA, CCW gains access to GEOINT products obtained from standard 
spectral imagery coupled with active sensing technologies such as synthetic aperture 
radar (SAR), light detection and ranging (LIDAR) sensors, and imagery derived 
MASINT to develop algorithms, tools and data exploitation processes that support the 
cyber mission sets of advanced geospatial intelligence. 
5. Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) 
DIA’s strategy focuses on the core mission areas of collection, analysis, 
and information services and management and essential enabling and 
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support functions. The strategy seeks—(1) first and foremost, a skilled 
workforce with the attributes and abilities required to meet today's 
requirements and future challenges; (2) innovative and integrated 
collection strategies and capabilities; (3) rapid transformation of 
information to knowledge through responsive and cogent analysis; and (4) 
state-of-the-practice information management to exploit the power of 
information technology. (DIA Mission Statement, 2010) 
DIA is the primary source for subject matter experts (SME) that support the 
scientific and technical analysis of foreign military weapons programs.  CCW can 
leverage this expertise and the all source analytic products it produces to better 
understand foreign military capabilities, particularly in the cyber domain.   
6. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) 
CIA is the nation’s first line of defense. CIA accomplishes what others 
cannot accomplish and go where others cannot go. CIA carries out their 
mission by—(1) collecting information that reveals the plans, intentions, 
and capabilities of our adversaries and provides the basis for decision and 
action; (2) producing timely analysis that provides insight, warning, and 
opportunity to the President and decision makers charged with protecting 
and advancing America’s interests; and (3) conducting covert action at the 
direction of the President to preempt threats or achieve U.S. policy 
objectives. (CIA Mission Statement, 2010) 
CCW can leverage CIA expertise on matters pertaining to the national security 
policy and laws to ensure that CCW science and technology research initiatives and 
capabilities follow the path of emergent technology. 
7. National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) 
The NRO provides highly classified resources in support of the U.S. cyber 
mission.  It is:  
A joint organization engaged in the research and development, acquisition, 
launch, and operation of overhead reconnaissance systems necessary to 
meet the needs of the Intelligence Community and of the Department of 
Defense.  The NRO conducts other activities as directed by the Secretary 
of Defense and/or the Director of National Intelligence. (NRO Mission 
Profile, 2010) 
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NRO manages all data collection from national satellite systems and airborne 
platforms.  CCW can tap into this resource to further research initiatives in the planned 
Cross-Domain cyberspace laboratory. 
8. Academia/Research Institutions 
a. NPS Information Dominance Sponsored Through Cebrowski 
Institute 
The Cebrowski Institute (CI) serves as the Cross-Discipline Research 
Institute responsible for the establishment of an overarching framework to align affiliated 
NPS research centers with OPNAV instructions that elucidates consolidation of the 
Information Dominance Corps officer communities under a single 18xx series of 
designators and integration of enlisted and civilian counterparts as well (CNO, 2010). 
Figure 5 depicts a notional view of extant NPS graduate programs 
functioning in parallel with associated research centers and how NPS will leverage its 
multifaceted environment to execute the NPS cyber mission in accordance with higher 
directives pertaining to cyberspace operations.  CCW has aligned itself with CI in support 




Figure 5.   Cebrowski Institute for Information Dominance (From Knorr, 2009) 
Additionally, Cebrowski Institute views information dominance, 
information assurance (IA) and cybersecurity from four perspectives: 
• Capability for information gathering, sensing, policies 
development, deciding, and coordinating in the areas of 
information, intelligence, counterintelligence, human derived 
information, and meteorology and oceanography. 
• Capability of dominating over enemies who appears as self-
organizing autonomous networks. 
• Capability for distributing information to operational forces of 
such quality that the commander’s intent doctrine can be 
implemented reliably. 
• Superior performance in these areas is critical to war-fighting 
capabilities, both in defense and attack. 
CI’s stated vision in this case, perfectly aligns with the Navy concept of 
information dominance, wherein every platform is a sensor that is networked so 
information can be used to achieve decision superiority thus enabling the tactical 
advantage. 
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b. United States Naval Academy (USNA) Cyber Warfare Center 
USNA will address similar cyber requirements and concerns. Its mission 
statement aligns perfectly with that of the CCW, namely: 
(1) To enhance the education of midshipmen in all areas of cyber security 
and operations; (2) to facilitate the sharing of expertise and perspectives in 
cyber-enabled technologies from across the Yard; (3) to provide a 
streamlined means of identifying priorities; to enhance inter-disciplinary 
research; and (4) to disseminate information, harmonize efforts, and shape 
a common framework for related cyber-enabled mission efforts. (USNA 
CWC Mission Statement, 2010) 
Current course offerings include the areas of networks, advanced 
networks, information assurance, advanced information assurance, cryptography, and 
digital forensics.  NPS CCW can leverage USNA cyber warfare center laboratory 
facilities and enable midshipman cross decking by strongly linking USNA cyber interests 
with ongoing NPS research initiatives through summer “cyber cruises.” 
c. University Partnerships 
Members of U.S. Congress have identified ten emergent cyber/Multi-INT 
universities, namely—University of Southern California (USC) Viterbi, New Mexico 
State University, Texas A&M, Utah State University, University of Houston, University 
of Texas El Paso, Arizona State University, University of Washington, University of 
Texas San Antonio, and Colorado School of Mines that can spearhead the educational 
path and assist OPNAV N2/N6 in fostering academic and research ties and serve as 
breeding grounds to grow the next generation of cyber/Multi-INT warriors.  Furthermore, 
NPS CCW has extended an outreach program with USC Viterbi, where students upon 
acceptance, will be employed as CCW interns and/or research assistants for a period of 
six months under their cooperative education work phase. 
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9. Research and Education Sponsors 
Resources such as National Science Foundation (NSF) and House Bill 4061 
“Cyber Security Education” can provide for necessary funding to pioneer new research 
and education initiatives within the CCW. 
NSF is: 
An independent federal agency created by Congress in 1950 ‘to promote 
the progress of science; to advance the national health, prosperity, and 
welfare; to secure the national defense…’ With an annual budget of about 
$6.06 billion, NSF is the funding source for approximately 20 percent of 
all federally supported basic research conducted by America's colleges and 
universities. (NSF Mission Statement, 2010) 
C. CENTER FOR CYBER WARFARE (CCW) ORGANIZATION 
CCW’s primary focus is the detection and prevention of network attacks.  Figure 
6 depicts the CCW organizational concept and defines key CCW staff and their 
corresponding responsibilities. 
 
Figure 6.   Cyber Center Concept (From Knorr, 2010) 
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1. CCW Director.  Serves as Chair on the Executive Committee for CI.  The CCW 
Director will be selected from within the faculty of the ECE Department, and will 
have an established reputation in the CCW subject area.  Eligibility criteria as 
defined in NAVPGSCOLINST 3900.2, requires that the Director be tenure track 
(TT) with eligibility for non-tenure track (NTT) given under special 
circumstances.  As the central authority for the operation and maintenance of the 
CCW, the CCW Director has the following responsibilities: 
• Provide CCW's strategic vision of its overall mission and operation to 
prospective students and faculty members. 
• Inform the Provost, Dean of Research, and ECE chair on all operational 
and administrative requirements of the CCW. 
• Submit and oversee announcements and/or calls for employment to 
include staff positions, TT and NTT faculty, and graduate research 
assistants to ensure employment of candidates who can effectively support 
CCW initiatives. 
• Maintain oversight on all student and faculty research within the CCW 
and ensure its relevance to current national security and technical 
objectives. 
• Monitor student and faculty research conducted within the CCW and 
associated laboratories in accordance with stated NPS business/academic 
best practices. 
• Collaborate with the directors of CI’s various unclassified and classified 
research laboratories, and fully coordinate CCW research with similar 
efforts being conducted in various NPS research facilities. 
• Ensure availability of resources to appropriate users at all times. 
• Ensure all research initiatives are handled at the appropriate level of 
classification, and within the appropriate facility. 
• Ensure the physical security of equipment and information stored within 
unclassified and classified CCW facilities. 
• Assist in shaping the level of effort and funding requirements for research 
tasks by collaborating with various sponsors and research partners. 
• Provide definitive guidance and assistance in developing solicitation and 
funding requests from current or potential research sponsors. 
• Appropriate fund expenditures provided to the CCW for both research and 
non-research related purposes. 
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• Provide oversight on the fund expenditures allocated to the CCW for 
material requisitions and travel. 
• Inform associated sponsors and research partners on the expenditure of 
research funds and the status of research efforts conducted within the 
CCW. 
• Coordinate and supervise the visitation of sponsors, partners, and other 
interested guests in the CCW. 
• Direct the CCW Associate Director in the daily maintenance of material, 
logistical, security, technical, procedural, and personnel issues within the 
CCW. 
• Conduct periodic performance appraisals for CCW employees, as 
required. 
• Collaboration with other agencies at multiple classification levels requires 
that Director meet applicable investigative, security clearance directives, 
and requirements. 
2. Resident NSA/CSS Chair.  At present, a resident NSA/CSS chair has not been 
identified.  If and when the position is filled, the Chair will serve as the primary 
liaison between NPS and the DoD cyber community.  In this respect, the Resident 
NSA Chair has the following responsibilities: 
• Serve on the external advisory board and ensure continued alignment of 
CCW with future U.S. cyber initiatives. 
• Provide guidance to the CCW on current and projected DoD cyber related 
technology and operational issues. 
• Assist the CCW Director in locating potential sponsors and establishing 
research partnerships with the greater intelligence community. 
• Monitor and assist the CCW Director in keeping appraised of the research 
efforts conducted within the various unclassified/classified laboratories, 
and maintaining the focus of these efforts on national SIGINT objectives. 
• Assist in shaping the level of effort and funding requirements for research 
tasks by collaborating with various sponsors and research partners.  
• Appropriate fund expenditures provided to the CCW from the DoD cyber 
community and diverse sponsors. 
• Provide guidance and assistance in proper classification of research 
initiatives, and the migration of such research into appropriate classified 
facilities. 
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• Collaboration with other agencies at multiple classification levels requires 
that the Chair meet applicable investigative, security clearance directives, 
and requirements. 
3. CCW Associate Director.  The Associate Director will principally be a NPS 
military faculty member, with expertise in specific communications subjects, 
appointed from any of the information dominance associated academic 
departments to assist the CCW Director as necessary.  The Associate Director has 
the following responsibilities: 
• Ensure information and knowledge received from CCW Director is 
delivered to the proper audience and addressed as required. 
• Coordinate efforts with analogous military academic institutions (i.e., 
USNA Cyber Warfare Center, AFIT) in hosting symposiums, 
collaborative exercises, and cross-deck training. 
• Coordinate CCW research efforts with other unclassified and classified 
NPS laboratories or facilities. 
• Serve as the liaison for military students and all matters pertaining to such. 
• Provide requisite IDC mentoring through the various Centers of 
Excellence both while on station and upon departure from NPS through 
follow-on training and distance learning opportunities. 
4. CCW Business Group.  NPS CCW presents itself as a unique institution that 
strives to increase the combat effectiveness of its forces through graduate 
education programs while enhancing the security of the United States.  To sustain 
academic education and foster continued research, the Business Group has been 
tasked with the following responsibilities: 
• Define and coordinate long and short-range financial plans and programs. 
• Research and accentuate innovative learning technologies, pedagogy, and 
practices to elicit and provide for enduring proficiency of strategic cyber 
principles. 
• Assist the CCW Director in locating potential sponsors and establishing 
research partnerships with civilian industries. 
• Develop and maintain strong working relations with combatant 
commanders (COCOM), type commanders (TYCOM), OPNAV 
organizations, Naval Warfare Development Command (NWDC), industry, 
and other organizations and agencies such as NSA, NRO, and DHS. 
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• Develop and maintain longstanding partnerships with other colleges and 
universities, business and industry (i.e., National Science Foundation), 
government, and the international community. 
• Recruit and maintain a diversified academia to support CCW mission and 
overarching NPS mission sets. 
• Ensure seamless integration of graduate students with faculty on advanced 
concept and research initiatives. 
5. CCW Laboratory Manager.  The CCW proposes six research laboratories 
focused on the different aspects of network operations and security.  The 
laboratories, which function at different levels of classification, have been 
identified as those with a concentration on computer network attack (CNA), 
communications research, computer network operations (CNO), Honeynet, cross-
domain cyberspace, and mobile broadband wireless.  The CCW Laboratory 
Manager is tasked with the following responsibilities: 
• Monitor and ensure operability of CCW server farm and associated 
equipment. 
• Maintain accurate documentation of all CCW major expenditures, 
equipment purchases and deliveries, and minor property inventory. 
• Provide support services to include that of control and computer systems, 
communications (including networking), data acquisition, physical 
measurements, electro-mechanical systems, telemetry, mobile radio, and 
signal analysis and generation equipment. 
• Provide administrative level support to faculty and ensure best effort in 
providing curricula laboratory requirements to include procurement of 
necessary hardware equipment, software applications and systems, and/or 
providing recommendation or resolution when current technology or lack 
of funding precludes such. 
• Oversee day-to-day operations and maintenance of all CCW laboratory 
and server spaces. 
6. CCW Faculty.  Composed of Tenure Track (TT) and Non-Tenure Track (NTT) 
faculty.  Primary responsibilities include but are not limited to: 
• Conduct sponsored, externally funded research. 
• Instruct or facilitate resident, synchronous, and asynchronous distance 
based learning via video tele-education (VTE) and/or computer network 
resources. 
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• Serve as an advisor to thesis students. 
• Participate in both internal and external service activities. 
• Assist in building the network engineering and cyber research program 
through collaboration between department faculty and solicitation of 
financial support for research initiatives. 
7. CCW Student Technical Directors.  Student technical directors will be selected 
from the student body based on their academic performance, efficient managerial 
skills, knowledge of cyber warfare and associated communications systems, and 
more importantly, their aggressive leadership and broad operational experience.  
The CCW Student Technical Director will play a major role in the daily operation 
of the CCW laboratories and must be forward thinking and proactive.  The 
amount and scope of administrative and operational responsibilities within the 
CCW may eventually necessitate that more than one Student Technical Director 
be appointed.  The responsibilities of the CCW Student Technical Director 
include: 
• Support the CCW Associate Director, the academic chairs, and the 
Resident NSA/CSS Chair in all matters pertaining to the efficient 
operation, maintenance, and requirements of the CCW facilities. 
• Coordinate, supervise, and assist students and faculty in the daily 
operation and maintenance of the CCW facilities, equipment, and other 
material. 
• Assist in shaping the level of effort and funding requirements for research 
tasks by collaborating with various sponsors and research partners. 
• Coordinate and assist in the identification of material, logistical, security, 
technical procedural, and personnel requirements within the CCW, and 
such requirements between the CCW and other cooperating NPS 
laboratories. 
• Assist CCW laboratory manager in maintaining accurate documentation of 
all CCW major expenditures, equipment purchases and deliveries, and 
accountability of minor property inventory. 
• Assist in the identification of potential candidates for his or her relief as 
the CCW Student Technical Director. 
8. Research Sponsors.  To sustain CCW's strategic cyber vision and research 
initiatives requires material and/or financial support from various military, 
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government, and commercial sponsors.  Unreserved participation of these 
sponsors is crucial for maintaining the focus of CCW research initiatives on the 
more technical issues and cyber challenges that can potentially affect our nation’s 
networks and critical infrastructures.  Equally important is that CCW conduct the 
most advanced research possible and maintain its “first mover” advantage through 
adoption of emergent technology.  First movers in this case would be the early 
entrants to market that have the opportunity to build capacity and knowledge base 
to discover and exploit unknown areas in the cyber domain. (Ketchen, Snow, & 
Hoover, 2004)  Establishment and sustainment of long term relationships is 
mutually beneficial to CCW and its associated sponsors in that research initiatives 
can exploit cyber issues using available pooled resources and output processes or 
resultant techniques that can further enhance situational awareness and protection 
of their respective cyber infrastructures. 
Prospective research sponsors should establish relationships via a standard 
 NPS research proposal, an Educational Partnership Agreement (EPA) and/or 
 Cooperative Research and Development Agreement (CRADA), Memorandum 
 of Agreement (MOA), or Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) that 
 provides the CCW with a detailed description of the specific joint technical 
 objectives that is mutually beneficial to all parties concerned and promotes 
 advancement of their scientific capabilities and knowledge.  Additional support 
 should be encouraged and may include: 
• Specification of mission objectives and reporting requirements. 
• Direct funding for research related material, labor, and travel. 
• Pooling of resources such as the transfer of excess equipment to the 
custody of the CCW and/or purchase of new hardware and other research 
material. 
• SME on-site/off site mentorship. 
• Awards for student research grants or fellowships. 
• Use of the sponsor’s indigenous research facilities. 
• Access to and use of proprietary hardware and software. 
• Sponsorship and coordination of student experience tours. 
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D. OPERATIONAL OBJECTIVES 
NPS provides a unique graduate environment where as an Echelon II command it 
serves the capacity both as an administrative and an operational unit.  In its 
administrative capacity, NPS provides a medium for: 
Collaboration and building partnerships with other colleges, universities, 
business and industry, government, and the international community. 
Furthermore, it fulfills the requirements of encouraging relevant and 
meritorious research while enabling the intellectual capital of NPS civilian 
and military faculty. (NPS Mission Statement, 2010) 
From the standpoint of its operational function – NPS exists for the purpose of 
increasing the combat effectiveness of the Navy and Marine Corps and other associated 
services.  As a military centric institution, NPS fulfills its operational relationship to the 
President of the United States (POTUS) and Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) by 
ensuring that advanced graduate education aligns with extant guidance particularly those 
policies pertaining to national security.  The Comprehensive National Cybersecurity 
Initiative (CNCI) formally launched January 2008 by President George W. Bush via 
National Security Presidential Directive 54/Homeland Security Presidential Directive 23 
(NSPD-54/ HSPD-23) is one such document that forms the foundation from which CCW 
mission sets are derived. 
In accordance with the aforementioned guidance, and to fully align with NPS 
Information Dominance stated goals, first and foremost, CCW will ensure that its 
organizational structure complements other CI initiatives allowing for seamless 
integration and to curtail potential duplication of efforts.  The succeeding paragraphs 
expounds on the specific initiatives that CCW has the capacity to support. 
• CCW will collaborate and sustain its extant relationship with its key 
stakeholders to guarantee that the most pressing issues are addressed.  To 
further enhance its research initiatives, CCW will foster expansion of its 
repertoire of sponsors and associations to include federal, state agencies, 
universities, private sector, and international partners interested in 
meshing cyber related research and development efforts (CNCI 4, 2010). 
• CCW will support efforts of increasing situational awareness amongst 
different cyber operations center by providing long-term research on 
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cross-domain solutions to ensure that interagency transfer of information 
both at the unclassified and classified levels transpires seamlessly and 
securely with minimal threat of compromise by a likely adversary (CNCI 
5, 2010). 
• CCW will leverage its relationship with key stakeholders identified in 
Chapter II Section B to properly shape and capture significant facets of a 
cyber counterintelligence plan for government wide implementation 
(CNCI 6, 2010). 
• CCW will coordinate horizontal integration of research and instructional 
efforts with related curricula and/or departments to ensure networks and 
the elements of data integrity, confidentiality, and authenticity are duly 
safeguarded from penetration, exploitation, and/or acts of cyber aggression 
(CNCI 7, 2010). 
• CCW will fully integrate U.S. Navy's information dominance objectives 
and forthcoming roadmaps into current and all future courses of 
instruction.  The IDC roadmaps referenced will align and synchronize all 
navy-related missions and covers the following areas – air dominance, 
convergence to a single Navy network, cyberspace operations, decision 
superiority, education, electromagnetic spectrum management, fleet battle 
management, integrated surface sensors, intelligence, surveillance, and 
reconnaissance (ISR), maritime ballistic missile defense, maritime domain 
awareness, spectrum usage, strike command and control, undersea 
dominance, and unmanned systems.  Based on these initiatives, CCW will 
leverage existing curriculums and resident research facilities to expand its 
scope and shape a cyber force armed with the requisite knowledge, skill 
sets, and tools to execute the stated mission tasks (CNCI 8, 2010). 
• As an academic institution, CCW can influence the “first mover 
advantage” by defining potential technological opportunities for study and 
research and developing long-term strategies for the cyber domain (CNCI 
9, 2010). 
• NPS represents a very diverse community of U.S. and international 
military and civilian professionals.  As such, CCW can tap into these 
individuals to better understand “user needs” and utilizing the Defense 
Acquisition Management System identify emergent technology 
opportunities and resource requirements to sustain collaborative research 
in program offices within the field activities of Naval Air Systems 
Command (NAVAIR), Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA), and 
Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command (SPAWAR).  From the 
standpoint of deterrence strategy, CCW can leverage resident Naval War 
College subject matter experts (SME) to develop and further refine 
policies focused on network offense (CNCI 10, 2010). 
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• Consistent with guidance derived from the National Strategy to Secure 
Cyberspace, CCW can further refine the Federal role to include 
cybersecurity of critical infrastructure to prevent, reduce vulnerability to, 
and minimize damage and recovery time caused by cyber attacks (CNCI 
12, 2010). 
E. FUNCTIONS 
As referred to earlier, CCW is one of several research centers on the NPS campus 
that provides related graduate programs that supports the vision of information 
dominance.  CCW’s functions are addressed in this section and the succeeding segment 
defines CCW’s specific areas of education and research. 
The CCW will meet the above needs and operational objectives by accomplishing 
a number of specific functions: 
• The CCW will serve as the leading facility for NPS students to conduct 
advanced unclassified/classified research related to communications and 
information systems, computer and information networks, and media and 
broadcast systems that support offensive and defensive cyber missions.  
Research will focus primarily on cyber warfare related initiatives.  CCW 
will additionally coordinate with the Center for Joint Service EW 
(CJSEW) that has the lead for radar and electronic warfare systems. 
• The combined technical knowledge and operational experience students 
and faculty gain from research conducted within the CCW will align with 
stated national security objectives and support military mission specific 
requirements where applicable. 
• Faculty associated with the CCW will perform advanced research in their 
respective fields of study and proactively engage students to support their 
endeavors. 
• Faculty and students will analyze and evaluate specific cyber related tools 
and cyber domain threats, conduct focused research, and write technical 
papers and theses on applicable cyber areas of interest.  The results of 
these efforts will provide value added to current and emergent cyber 
techniques that could potentially initiate national and/or military cyber 
policy change recommendations. 
• The CCW will acquire requisite equipment and corresponding support 
elements to pursue advanced research functionalities and additionally 




all computers and network equipment, communications hardware and 
software, and the facilities and personnel support deemed necessary to 
maintain them. 
• The CCW in conjunction with its associated laboratories, will ensure 
adherence to specific guidelines for circumstances that require migration 
of sensitive research themes from the unclassified CCW laboratories to 
NPS’s Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility (SCIF), and/or to 
the laboratory facilities of collaborative research sponsors, for continued 
studies at higher classification levels. 
• The CCW will maintain an independent secure space in the long-term, to 
directly sustain research efforts that require use of classified media or 
techniques, alleviating direct impact on allocated resources supporting 
other NPS research facilities. 
• The CCW will proactively lead collaborative research projects with other 
unclassified and classified laboratories, both at NPS and other various 
academic, military, and national research facilities.  Doing so will ensure 
most efficient use of available national research resources, research 
initiatives are structured appropriately to meet the specific requirements, 
and are mutually beneficial to all research partners. 
• The CCW will provide all military and civilian students, irrespective of 
designator or job description and level of clearance, significant exposure 
to the unclassified aspects of cyber technology, tools, techniques, and 
tactics, and promote the awareness of cyber options at the strategic and 
tactical level. 
• The CCW will coordinate both on-site and off-site education opportunities 
for students, faculty, and other military and civilian personnel to hone 
their understanding and improve skills required to use the tools available 
in the CCW and enhance laboratory research as it applies to the cyber 
domain. 
• The CCW will serve as a database repository of unclassified background 
and technical information.  The intent is to support new students who are 
seeking additional guidance and provide focus on their prospective 
research areas that will culminate with the completion of a masters' thesis.  
Relevant research and experimentation initiatives and all master theses 
will then be compiled into the CCW database repository. 
• Students and faculty associated with the CCW will provide solicitations to 
establish technical and financial sponsorships with the various military 






• The CCW will help to educate senior visitors and other guests on current 
cyber issues, tools, and possible vulnerabilities in both commercial off the 
shelf (COTS) technologies and DoD Intelligence systems, through 
demonstrations utilizing applicable resources of the CCW and presenting 
results of studies and analysis conducted in the CCW laboratory. 
F. FOCUS AREAS 
1. Education 
The ECE department currently offers several degree programs namely—Master of 
Science in Electrical Engineering (MSEE), Master of Science in Engineering Science 
with a major in Electrical Engineering MSES(EE), Master of Science in Computer 
Engineering (MSCE), Master of Science in Engineering Science with a major in 
Computer Engineering MSES(CE), Electrical Engineer, Doctorate (Ph.D.) all of which 
are research based and Master of Engineering with Major in Electrical Engineering 
MEng(EE) and Master of Engineering with Major in Computer Engineering MEng(CE) 
that are course based. 
As an example, the MEng (EE) degree with a focus on SIGINT/Cyber/Space 
Systems is intended for students who are recent BSEE/CS/CE graduates.  Special cases 
wherein a student by virtue of their education and on-the-job experience exhibit 
capability to likewise specialize in this area of study can also be given due consideration.  
This coursework-based degree allows practicing engineers to analyze cyber networks, 
specify characteristics of cyber systems, and demonstrate an understanding of attack and 
defense cyber systems. 
Figure 7 illustrates the typical course of study that awards a Master of Science in 
Cyber Systems and Operations upon successful completion of curriculum requirements.  
The requirements would include a regular track equivalent to 4 courses, a deep track of 8 




Figure 7.   MS in Cyber Systems and Operations Matrix (From Knorr, 2010) 
Tracks in Cyber Operations Tracks in Cyber Operations 
IA Professional Certification Network Engineering 
Cyber Security Fundamentals Information Systems Security Engineering 
Cyber Security Offense/Defense Cyber Warfare 
Identity Management SIGINT and EW 
Digital Forensics Space Systems 
Cyber Planning and Targeting Systems Engineering 
Command and Control for Cyber Operations Trustworthy Systems 
Information Operations  
Social Networks  
Mathematics of Secure Communication Deep Tracks 
Mathematics of Networks Cyber System Defender 
Critical Infrastructure Defense Cyber System Hunter 
Table 2.   Track Course Requirements (From Knorr, 2010) 
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To satisfy requirements addressed by C10F and other associated organizations, 
CCW proposes a comprehensive curriculum that covers the general areas of signals 
intelligence, computer communications, network engineering, information operations 
systems, and computer network operations to include network defense, surveillance, and 
attack.  The structure of this curriculum in turn provides Electrical Engineering (EE) 
graduates with the requisite principles, tools, and techniques for application in cyber 
research, design, development, testing, and evaluation in follow-on tours. 
Figures 8 and 9 present a theoretical flowchart of prerequisite coursework and 
associated curriculum elective that culminates with the completion of 16 units of EC0810 
focused on thesis research and submission of a graduate level cyber engineering related 
thesis.  Supporting directives additionally emphasize that other courses may be used in 
satisfaction of the elective requirement with the advance approval of the Cyber 
Engineering Academic Associate. 
A proposed Cyber Warfare Certification Program with focus on EW, networks, 
computer systems, digital communications, signal processing, and guidance, navigation 
and control is additionally derived based on completion of the modules illustrated in the 
core courses matrix of Figure 8.  The target audience would be distance learners through 
a distributed learning environment provided by Center for Educational Design, 
Development, and Distribution (CED3). 
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Figure 8.   Prerequisite for Cyber Engineering Specialization 
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Figure 9.   Cyber Engineering Specialization Electives 
In addition to the proposed coursework, to assure a minimum level of competency 
for prospective Cyber Engineers, CCW will incorporate the Information Dominance 
Corps (IDC) Personnel Qualification Standard (PQS) and NAVNETWARCOM’s Job 
Duty Task as a benchmark tool that focuses on providing an introduction to fundamental 
principles and the study of specific functional communication, information processing, 
and intelligence systems. 
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Upon graduation, based on the Introduction to Fundamental Principles section of 
the PQS, the student should have the ability to: 
• Demonstrate basic understanding of applicable organizational doctrine and 
regulations. 
• Exhibit knowledge of different types of Intrusion Detection System (IDS). 
• Demonstrate knowledge of the different types of firewall—security. 
• Define maintenance installation requirements for Cryptologic Carry On 
Programs (CCOP). 
• Demonstrate knowledge of circuits in terms of frequency range, type, units 
on the net, and usage as it pertains to naval communications. 
• Define satellite communications principles. 
• Explain the rules of engagement (ROE) in reference to computer network 
attack (CNA), CNA operational preparation of the environment (OPE), 
computer network defense response action (CND RA). 
• Define applicable radio frequency theory terminology, processes, and 
modulation principles. 
• Define all intelligence disciplines and applicability to fusion analysis. 
• Define intelligence systems and roles of different collection assets. 
• Define IW Electronic Warfare terms. 
• Demonstrate IW knowledge of the different types of radar.  
• Demonstrate IW knowledge of seeker technology. 
• Define and explain meteorological terms and elements. 
• Define and explain oceanographic terms and elements. 
• Exhibit knowledge of Information Professional (IP) fundamentals. 
• Exhibit knowledge of space fundamentals. 
Under the Introduction to Systems PQS section, the student should be able to: 
• Identify key system components and component parts of communication 
systems. 
• Define purpose and functions of information processing systems. 
• Demonstrate the information systems architecture and key system 
components and component parts (NAVEDTRA 43360, 2010).  
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Application of these education initiatives perfectly aligns with the roadmap set 
forth by Director of Total Force Management RDML Robin Braun, which shifts the 
former 16XX designators knowledge base to a more comprehensive skill set of 
1800/Oceanographers, 1810/Information Warfare, 1820/ Information Professional, 
1830/Intelligence, 1840/Cyber Warfare Engineer, and 1850/ Cumulative IDC Billets, 
which utilize information as their main battery to sustain the Navy’s vision of 
information dominance in the fields of ISR, cyber warfare, C2, information and 
knowledge management (Braun, 2010). 
2. Research 
The demand for technology that is both evolutionary and revolutionary will likely 
continue to persist and, as such, requires a roadmap towards a more in depth 
understanding of near term and long term capabilities.  Organizations such as the 
International Telecommunication Union (ITU) that are responsible for enabling and 
sustaining global telecommunications through standardization and collaboration; the 
Federal Communications Commission (FCC) and National Telecommunications and 
Information Administration (NTIA) that serves as regulatory bodies for non-Federal and 
Federal allocation for use of the radio spectrum; and the Institute of Electrical and 
Electronics Engineers (IEEE) charged with management of Internet standards provide the 
foundation and standards from which CCW will derive both theoretical and applied 
research in the areas of computer network operations, information operations, signals 
intelligence, and cyber. 
In the field of mobile communications alone, Figure 10 provides a visual 
indication of the dramatic rise in its penetration among the subscriber base that in turn 
equates to a sharp increase to data usage and the need for more robust capacity cellular 
systems coupled with improved spectral efficiency and access technologies.  While ITU-
Radio Communications and IEEE have provided visions and standards addressing this 
issue, consortiums such as the Wireless World Research Forum (WWRF), Mobile IT 
Forum, Future Technology for Universal Radio Environment Project (FuTURE), Next 
Generation Mobile Communication (NGMC) Forum, 4G Research Cooperation Projects 
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in the European Sixth Framework Program (FP6), Worldwide Wireless Initiative (WWI), 
Samsung 4G Forum, and eMobility Technology Platform have each taken the lead in 
spearheading major 4G initiatives in the areas of network and mobile systems 
technologies such as ad-hoc networks, quality of service (QoS) and security and 
encryption techniques; and transmission and access techniques such as Code Division 
Multiple Access (CDMA), Orthogonal Frequency Division Multiple Access (OFDMA), 
and Time Division Multiple Access (TDMA) (Prasad & Kim, 2006). 
 
Figure 10.   Global ICT Developments 1998-2009 (From ITU, 2010) 
Of particular interest right now to the global telecommunications community is 
the advent of Fourth Generation (4G) technologies particularly that of Long Term 
Evolution (LTE) and Worldwide Interoperability for Microwave Access (WiMAX).  
Figure 11 is representative of the current deployment of infrastructure supporting these 
broadband technologies.  Internet connectivity is slowly shifting away from fixed 
broadband to wireless application due to absence of copper and Digital Subscriber Line 
(DSL), minimal broadband connectivity and need to sustain economic growth and 
development.  Comparison of both technologies shows analogous performance and 
 42
capacity in the 1.5 to 28 MHZ channels.  These same emerging broadband standards 
utilize Orthogonal Frequency Division Multiplexing (OFDM), Internet Protocol (IP), and 
Multiple-Input Multiple-Output/Beam Forming (MIMO/BF) techniques to exhibit 
increased efficiency, capacity, and scalability.  While WiMAX and LTE are available to 
the consumer, both have not quite hit the mark in attaining designation as International 
Mobile Telecommunications (IMT) advanced 4G technology.  
 
Figure 11.   WiMAX and LTE Deployment Status Worldwide (From Maravedis, 2010) 
The mere fact that this technology will likely continue to carry out at least for the 
next five to ten years as other research initiatives take shape for the future generation 
network known as Broadband Personal Area Network (B-PAN), it is imperative that 
CCW remains at the forefront in developing and thoroughly understanding LTE and 
WiMAX.  ECE department professor, Dr. McEachen last year presented a brief 
addressing the threats to mobile wireless device and the path industry is taking to meet 
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increased wireless broadband requirements.  Figure 12 depicts Dr. McEachen’s visual 
representation on the evolution of WiMAX and LTE technologies. 
 
Figure 12.   Wireless Broadband Requirements (From McEachen, 2009) 
To remain abreast of these potential revolutionary transformations CCW will 
conduct research of innovative technology and continued development of existing 
communication technologies utilizing available tools and techniques, modeling, 
simulation, computer programming and theoretical analyses that will be supported 
through six specific laboratories illustrated in Figure 13 with documentation of finished 





Figure 13.   Center for Cyber Warfare Laboratories (From Knorr, 2010) 
• Computer Network Attack Laboratory—this is one of three enablers of 
computer network operations (CNO), the laboratory is located in secure 
spaces and encompasses operations that disrupt, deny, degrade, and/or 
destroy information resident in computers and computer networks, or the 
computers/networks themselves. 
• Communications Research Laboratory—the ECE department does a 
significant amount of research in the cryptology and other 
communications-related subjects under the aegis of the Center for 
Cryptologic Research.  This laboratory provides hardware and software 
support of these projects. 
• Computer Networking Laboratory—the laboratory supports instruction 
and research in the area of network design, engineering, and infrastructure 
development. Thesis work and research undertaken include modeling and 
simulation of high-speed and wireless networks and related protocols, 
video transmission over Asynchronous Transfer Mode (ATM) networks, 
traffic modeling, simulation and analysis, design and simulation of wide 
area networks, and related areas. Lab facilities include ATM switches, 
routers, Local Area Network (LAN) switches, video processing 
equipment, a channel simulator, a protocol analyzer, network simulation 
packages, and Windows New Technology (NT) workstations. The lab 
serves MSEE/EE degrees in both Communications and Computer tracks. 
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• Honeynet Laboratory—this laboratory incorporates Honeypot resources 
to detect, research, and prevent unauthorized or malicious access to 
network systems.  The Honeynet Laboratory will allow students and 
researchers to develop a penetration, collection, and testing infrastructure 
focused on scanning the target environment external to the NPS domain, 
client and server side exploitation and post-exploit analysis of infected 
machines and arriving at potential resolutions.  Acquired knowledge can 
be written as a Proof of Concept code to address exploitation techniques. 
• Mobile Broadband Wireless Laboratory—research on LTE and 
WiMAX and future Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers 
(IEEE) 802 technologies will be focused in this laboratory. 
• Cross-Domain Cyberspace Laboratory—functionally this laboratory 
will support in multi-INT disciplines.  The primary collaborative partner 
will be NRO. (NPS ECE, 2010) 
G. ENDSTATE 
Figure 14 illustrates the desired end state for the CCW.  The intent is to have 
CCW function as the premiere Academic Research Center of Excellence incorporating 
the key tenets of information dominance—Multi-Intelligence, Information Warfare, 
Information Technology, Space, Cyber Warfare while sustaining open collaboration with 
the government and private sectors across multiple classification levels through cross-
domain technology.  To accomplish this would require both buy-in from all key 
stakeholders depicted in Figure 14 and a proactive Community of Interest (COI) that 













Figure 14.   Future Cross-Domain Cyber Missions (From Garcia, 2010) 
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III. PROPOSED CCW NETWORK REQUIREMENTS 
A. OVERVIEW OF DATA COMMUNICATION 
Probabilities of analysis such as those studies conducted by Shannon that 
addressed the efficiency of communication channels in data transmissions played a 
decisive factor in utilizing the basic telephone network to initially transmit digital data.  
Figure 15 presents the fundamental building blocks of the communication model.  The 
key elements are: 
• Source—a device such as a workstation client that generates data for 
transmission. 
• Transmitter—a medium that converts and programs information into a 
usable form for transmission across the wired/wireless network.  For 
example, this could be a modem that takes 1s and 0s and converts it into 
an analog signal for delivery to a telephone network. 
• Transmission system—a simple transmission line or complex network 
that routes and provides a connection between the source and destination. 
• Receiver—a medium such as a modem or transmission line that senses 
incoming traffic and converts the received signal to a usable format for 
delivery to a destination device. 
• Destination—end stage (i.e., server) that receives incoming data from 
receiver (Stallings, 1997). 
 
Figure 15.   Simplified Communications Model (From Stallings, 1997) 
 
 48
The variables noted in Figure 15 enabled the exchange of information between 
two parties, a sender and a receiver via circuit switching technology such as the plain old 
telephone system (POTS).  Today, while the basic telephone circuit continues to be 
employed in a communication network, more cost efficient means of both analog and 
digital transmission have evolved to solve the issues of distance between the source and 
destination and the need for a more robust system that can handle multiple transmissions 
at the same time.  While packet switching technology opened the doors for multiple 
source clients to transmit data over a shared medium, a set of interoperable 
communication standards known as the Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol 
(TCP/IP) protocol suite followed suit and has formed the basis for what we know as the 
Internet. 
B. CYBER INFRASTRUCTURE 
Certain research and academic experimentation, testing, and evaluation although 
unclassified in nature will require deployment in a contained environment separate from 
the NPS campus network also referred to as the intranet.  The CCW infrastructure will 
include a closed or private network, its associated network applications and network 
programming, data and network security, and Internet accessibility via a public network.  
CCW will additionally manage a detached server facility that consists of multiple 
operating systems and applications, a database repository for data storage and effortless 
retrieval of required resources, and internal backup system capabilities. 
C. NETWORK REQUIREMENTS 
Proper planning focused on architectural evaluation, prioritization, allocation of 
available resources and a thorough understanding of system requirements is crucial to the 
successful deployment of the chosen IT infrastructure.  Currently, industry and military 
agencies are shifting away from stove-piped systems to a service oriented architecture 
(SOA) framework.  Employment of an SOA environment delivers benefits in terms of the 
ability to leverage legacy systems, cost-efficiency, agility, adaptability, and 
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interoperability across multiple systems.  To this end, again Figure 13 provides a block 
diagram of CCW laboratories that will need to be considered in the overall construct. 
Software and system requirements needed to generate a fully operational IT 
infrastructure tend to be infinite in scope.  In that respect, a fundamental provision prior 
to acquisition and deployment of systems is to draft a requirements document.  At the 
outset, having a transparent layout of the scope of the project that may include areas such 
as requirements, assumptions, architecture, network protocols, networking hardware, 
topologies and access methods, etc. provides assurance that all key stakeholders have 
some understanding of the proposed architecture end state, reduces the risk of “mission 
creep” and additionally provides a chronological history of steps taken that can be 
referenced should they require it. 
The network design should include a spreadsheet that lists all the devices that will 
have access to the network and addresses port and server requirements.  Additionally, 
capacity planning that pertains to future growth should be factored in using the 15 percent 
rule.  Another requirement that engineers typically overlooked that should be considered 
is the need for inter-switch trunks for firewall services or content service modules that 
typically have dedicated trunks.  After identifying the number of ports needed, the next 
step would be to map out the port allocation and determine what devices will serve what 
purpose.  These devices can then be further broken down to identify specific hardware 
requirements.  In addition to port layouts, Internet protocol (IP) network and virtual local 
area network (VLAN) should be documented for future network configuration and 
reconfiguration.  Also for consideration in Figure 16 is a bay face layout or diagram that 
provides a detailed illustration of the makeup of the rack that includes power, cabling, 
and patch panels requirements as well.  Developing this layout offers that additional 
sanity check to ensure the server room can accommodate enough racks to support 
equipment purchased.  Lastly, power in terms of alternating current/direct current 




Figure 16.   Bay Face Layout (From Donahue, 2007) 
It must be noted that the above stated network requirements although it is not all-
inclusive it does provide the key system requirements for the deployment of the CCW IT 
infrastructure.  Additionally, while most network designs follow the classic three-tier 
model namely the core, distribution, and access levels, this CONOP document proposes 
the deployment of a virtual environment.  Appendix A, added as an addendum addresses 
this virtual environment and discusses the framework, configuration, and equipment 
requirements for the proposed Honeynet Laboratory. 
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IV. CONCLUSIONS 
Albert Einstein once said: 
The significant problem we face cannot be solved at the same level of 
thinking we were at when we created them. 
And more recently, former DNI Mike McConnell made the statement as well that: 
If the nation went to war today, in a cyber war we would lose. 
The urgency of developing a cadre of professionals trained to operate and conduct 
full spectrum operations in the cyber domain cannot be stressed enough.  Malicious 
activity and attacks on network systems are here to stay for the interim or until scientists, 
engineers, academia, and military alike find a plausible solution to this issue.  While 
other countries such as China, India, and Russia have official cyber warfare doctrines, 
development of U.S. doctrine that communicates our offensive and defensive cyber 
posture will likely be slow in coming (Gray, 2009, p. 217–219).  Such is the case because 
our policy advisors need to deliberate and truly understand the ramifications our potential 
actions will have both at the national level and towards the international community as 
well.  Moreover, while the concept of a well balanced strategy whether it be preemptive 
akin to the Cold War era or preventive with the intent to strike first to deter future 
aggressor actions seemingly appears to be the right option to pursue, the dynamic 
environment we live in restrains us from tying ourselves down to any one specific 
doctrine.  In order to effectively operate in the cyberspace environment and maintain that 
competitive advantage over the adversary we need to build an agile cyber workforce 
strengthened by the collaborative partnerships between government agencies, the private 
sector, and academia.  It requires a workforce with a predictive vice reactive mindset. 
History elucidates the significance an academia-military alliance brings to the 
table and this serves as the cornerstone for CCW’s philosophy on how to handle the 
emerging cyber threat.  In 1941, the Office of Scientific Research and Development 
(OSRD) was established by then President Franklin D. Roosevelt for the purposes of 
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advancing military technology.  This approach taken came with the realization that 
something had to be done right then and there to the best of OSRD capabilities and with 
the recognition that following this course of action came with the likelihood of potential 
failure.  President Roosevelt was considered a very astute individual and using the 
academia-military partnership as a means to bring together a “mind meld” of both 
scientific and strategic intellect, he did achieve the desired end state of revolutionizing 
military capabilities through the development of weapons systems as illustrated in 
notable works such as the Manhattan Project from which the first atomic bombs evolved; 
sonar, radar to include technologies to defeat them known as electronic countermeasures 
(ECM), torpedo and amphibious vehicles; and sponsorship of Intelligence, 
Reconnaissance, and Surveillance (ISR) technology (Potente, 2010). 
Current President of the United States (POTUS) Barak Obama is well aware of 
the numerous challenges that exist in cyberspace and his support of such is mirrored in 
recently promulgated documents on securing cyberspace and the formal implementation 
of a cybersecurity coordinator within the White House.  In line with President Obama’s 
actions, Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) Robert Gates subsequently passed a 
memorandum to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the formal establishment of DoD entities 
focused on building capabilities to achieve information dominance in the air, land, sea, 
and space, all of which overlap in the cyber domain.  In his words Secretary Gates made 
it transparent that: 
…modernization goals should be tied to the actual and prospective 
capabilities of known adversaries—not by what might be technologically 
feasible for a potential adversary given unlimited time and resources. 
The foundation for the establishment of the cyber commands is based on the 
Phantom Fleet concept utilized during World War II, with four key variables given 
consideration—(1) the rank of the Commander to ensure his voice is heard and decisions 
made prevails; (2) shore establishment with capacity to commandeer operational units as 
the situation dictates; (3) small organization with access to all agencies without going 
through red tape; and (4) assumption of fleet status to maintain operational functionalities 
(Farago, 1962, p. 165).  Additionally, to elicit full spectrum cyber operations the 
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Information Dominance Corps was formally established in January 2010 bringing 
together the disciplines of intelligence, information warfare, information technology, 
meteorology and oceanography, and the addition of cyber warfare.  Such action has 
brought our information dominance strength to 45,000 personnel.  From an academic 
standpoint, NPS CCW fits the bill to deliver the technical foundation for the potential 
cyber workforce who will support requirements and fill the operational billets of these 
organizations similar to the OSRD academia-military alliance in 1941…“but how so?” 
one may ask. 
Consider the terms – data, information, and knowledge.  While there is some truth 
in that all three are dynamically interrelated, people do tend to use them interchangeably 
forgetting that each variable performs a very distinct process.  To better understand this 
relationship—data is typically associated with 1s and 0s.  Data, in its raw form, is useless 
to the average person (with the exception of those individuals who have inherent tacit 
knowledge of what those 1s and 0s actually mean).  In taking this data one can analyze it 
further or convert it into some usable form referred to here as information.  Exposure to 
such data and information then generates knowledge that an individual can use to make 
more informed decisions if not only to enhance his explicit knowledge.  Explicit or 
“codified” knowledge in this case refers to knowledge that is transmittable in formal, 
systematic language whereas tacit knowledge is personal, context-specific, and therefore 
hard to formalize and communicate (Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995). 
The key takeaway here is that to acquire this knowledge requires some form of 
learning.  As suggested earlier, CCW has ECE faculty and research staff that has the 
background and expertise to influence growth and reinforce the explicit knowledge base 
of its students through education and cutting-edge research.  History dictates that learning 
through action and knowing through motion does breed distinction (Nissen, 2006).  Over 
the last century, NPS has managed to deliver prominence in the battlefield in the likes of 
ADM Arleigh Burke a graduate of Chemical Engineering, ADM James Watkins in 
Mechanical Engineering, GEN Michael Hagee in Electrical Engineering and more 
recently, ADM Michael Mullen earning distinction in the field of Operations Research 
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and GEN Alexander in the fields of EW and Physics.  Again, to gain information 
dominance requires creation and sustainment of such knowledge through learning. 
This thesis prescribes a concept of operations document and framework that can 
serve as the baseline for further work and refinement.  As presented in the preceding 
chapters, this thesis proposes an operational construct wherein buy-in from key 
stakeholders within the disciplines of intelligence, information warfare, information 
technology, space, meteorology and oceanography, and cyber warfare is essential.  As 
VADM McCullough FLTCYBERCOM/C10F Commander stated: 
One of our lines of operation (LOO) is to achieve and sustain the ability to 
navigate and maneuver freely in cyberspace and the RF spectrum. 
By interconnecting the above stated disciplines, the capability to achieve information 
dominance across cyberspace becomes more apparent (McCullough, 2010). 
Emergent technology calls for adoption of a more adaptive and agile cyber 
infrastructure and we propose such with the conjectural framework illustrated in Chapter 
III.  As illustrated in Appendix A, successful deployment of a Honeynet within other 
academic institutions and results derived from employment of research initiatives similar 
to the Honeynet Project shows potential where CCW researchers and students have 
access to real time raw data that they can analyze and draw from. 
In closing, CCW exhibits strong potential to emerge as a premier facility to train 
the next generation cyber workforce.  Tie this in together with the robust collaborative 
network current ECE faculty and associate researchers have built with existing 
government agencies and universities and CCW is well on its way to conducting full 
spectrum cyberspace education and research operations that reaches across all domains 
and leverages CCW ability to emerge as the primary Academic Research Center of 
Excellence - Cyberspace.  Investing in cutting edge research and development is not a 
want but a must and from this research and parallel cyber education, the acquisition and 
deployment of emergent technology will help sustain future battles in the cyber domain 




Recommendations for future work would be to align CCW’s highly technical 
graduate program with written governing laws and policies.  While not covered in detail, 
a book released by the National Academies Press (NAP) titled “Technology, Policy, Law 
and Ethics Regarding U.S. Acquisition and use of Cyberattack Capabilities” provides 
fundamental insight on courses of action and moral principles to consider with regards to 
the acquisition and proper use of cyber attack capabilities.  Further research on these 
issues of legal and ethics rights; policy; technical and operational capabilities; and 
organizational structure will facilitate and provide focus on future CCW research and 
development initiatives as well as prepare undergraduates with the requisite skill sets to 
analyze cyber networks and recognize characteristics that requires employment of 
offensive and defensive cyber actions (Owens, Dam & Lin, 2009).  Defining the rules of 
engagement (ROE) particularly with respect to—(1) the chain of command structure for 
notification of initiation of attacks, (2) when to execute an attack, (3) who can be 
targeted, (4) duration of cyber activities, and (5) conditions for exception to ROE are just 
a few issues for consideration (Carr, 2009). 
Further exploration on the correlation between the standard cyber attack 
methodology referenced in Chapter I and the U.S. phases of operation needs to be 
analyzed.  Phase 0 Shaping and Phase I operations pertain to the deployment of resources 
to collection background information in order to gain situational awareness of the current 
environment.  Similar to Phase II operations, scanning pertains to exploitation of known 
vulnerabilities or holes in the system.  As is in Phase III operations, the attacker 
dominates by gaining access to systems either through illegitimate means or known 
weaknesses in network systems.  In Phase IV, the attacker is attempting to stabilize his 
operating environment through data deletion, theft, alteration, and storing of malware.  In 
Phase V, the attacker now has access to the infected system and has the ability to enable 
and redeploy malware at will. 
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Initiate additional investigation of other technologies currently being fielded that 
exhibits the potential for application towards research of cyber initiatives currently 
underway at NPS.  For example, Figure 17 depicts a network management tool that 
provides a graphical user interface (GUI) of current cyber situation.  Indicators and lists 
provide near real time threat condition and defensive posture of network systems. 
 
Figure 17.   Cyber Situation Dashboard (From Technolytics, 2009) 
Commence development of a more comprehensive definition of hardware and 
software requirements to support a fully functional Cyber Warfare Research Center.  The 
architecture and server hardware equipment listing proposed in Appendix A was based on 
information obtained from applicable documents and a study of existing virtual Honeynet 
installations.  Appendix A covered the essential features needed to deploy a virtual server 
but there are a myriad of options that still need to be considered in determining the 
feasibility of this virtual environment.  A more practical follow on to this thesis is to 
incorporate the remaining five research areas and provide a more thorough discussion of 
other existing or emerging technology.  Again due consideration should also be given to 
ensure that the deployed network environment will be flexible and agile enough to handle 
future mission set requirements without having to sacrifice cost and/or efficiency. 
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APPENDIX   HONEYNET PROJECT 
At the writing of this thesis, ECE determined that the Honeynet Laboratory would 
be the primary focus for the initial architectural construct.  A robust, scalable network 
with an analogous configuration that can later be implemented to support additional 
research and education initiatives such as cross-domain transfer technology, computer 
network attack, computer network operations, mobile broadband wireless, and 
communications research was also considered to ensure rapid implementation of the 
aforementioned services.  This section discusses a viable data communication network 
comprised of interconnected nodes and links that supports deployment of multiple 
operating system platforms and applications and allows for pooling of available resources 
to increase operational efficiency. 
A. HONEYNET OVERVIEW 
Honeypots are the resources and methodologies utilized to detect, research, and 
prevent unauthorized or malicious access to network systems.  A Honeynet on the other 
hand is a type of Honeypot primarily used for research. 
Research on the evolution of "Honeypots" that being, methodologies used to 
gather data and information for analysis on attacks and compromise of workstations 
confirms that numerous systems and techniques exist.  The Deception Toolkit (DTK) 
developed by Fred Cohen, one of the pioneers in developing a system that gave the 
appearance of network vulnerabilities; Cybercop Sting developed by Network Associates, 
Inc. that was built as a decoy server; Netfacade from Verizon; BackOfficer Friendly 
(BOF) focused primarily on Back Orifice attacks; Specter supported by Netsec; Honeyd a 
prepackaged open source Unix honeypot; and Symantec's Mantrap also known as Decoy 
Server are all examples of commercially available honeypots. 
The Honeynet, in this case was selected for several reasons.  First, the Honeynet 
can emulate multiple commercially available operating systems vice focusing solely on a 
single system.  Second, as suggested earlier, it is an effective research tool because as a 
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high interaction Honeypot it allows the attacker to interact with an actual operating 
system.  Third, a global consortium known as the "Honeynet Project" exists that is 
committed to providing shared situational awareness of the current extant threats that 
exist in network systems and additionally provides the necessary tools and innovative 
techniques to deter cyber threats.  Fourth, one can learn from studies completed by the 
different factions and also derive proven techniques to increase efficiency in the initial 
installation and setup of the CCW laboratory.  Lastly, the NPS ECE faculty has had 
exposure to the Honeynet environment in the past thereby reducing potential downtime of 
having to educate and train the staff prior to the deployment of the Honeynet Laboratory. 
With this in mind, the intent of this section then is to offer an adaptive approach 
focused on the establishment of a small-scale testing and server environment; in this case 
a virtual Honeynet environment. 
B. HONEYNET FRAMEWORK 
It has been established that the operating environment would incorporate both 
physical and virtual infrastructure therefore the task of migration of current infrastructure 
was determined as having minimal impact to the overall construct of the proposed 
framework.  Not withstanding, to ensure seamless transition key players such as network 
administrators, developers, security administrators, IT management, storage 
administrators, and operating system administrators must all be brought onboard and 
understand the unique and new concepts that virtualization provides. 
It has also been determined that a service-oriented architecture (SOA) framework 
should be implemented vice stove-piped system architecture.  An SOA framework will 
ensure interoperability of the multiple operating systems and associated languages, allow 
use of standard, commercial off the shelf (COTS) technology vice proprietary systems, 
and ability to reuse components thus increasing efficiency while decreasing overall costs. 
In line with this the key stakeholders must ensure that requirements both functional and 
non-functional are clearly delineated prior to implementation.  While the initial 
installation will be for the Honeynet Laboratory, requirements should address other 
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research initiatives as well to ensure acquisition of appropriate server and equipment and 
to account for load balancing; electrical; heating, ventilating, and air conditioning 
(HVAC); and space requirements. 
One must also note that there is inherent risk associated with running a Honeynet 
Laboratory and use of this specific Honeypot configuration requires strict adherence to 
best business practices and system rules.  To mitigate these risks, standard operating 
procedures (SOP) should address and follow policies set by Information Technology and 
Communications Services (ITACS) and Department of the Navy Chief Information 
Officer (DONCIO) in concert with the universal practice of employing firewalls, 
Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS), segregation of testing environment from network, and 
virtual private network (VPN) as deemed applicable.  A report generated by Joseph 
Greenfield identified that the laboratory be comprised of three elements—a closed, secure 
network environment for malware analysis; an open network for Honeynet analysis; and 
a hybrid configuration to support classroom instruction and experimentation with 
computer security countermeasures (Greenfield, 2010). 
C. HONEYNET LABORATORY REQUIREMENTS 
The standard virtualization hypervisors out on the market are Citrix Xenserver 
and VMware vSphere.  Based on research of existing software and technology, a 
virtualized environment utilizing VMware infrastructure was preferred for several 
reasons.  VMware allows for multiple operating systems to be deployed on the same 
physical medium.  Physical hardware can be configured or partitioned for more efficient 
use of available resources.  Studies have shown the Honeynet architecture being deployed 
in analogous academic environments and how it has yielded valuable data results that can 
be used for further analysis of cyber attacks patterns.  Additionally, VMware's robust, 
scalable platform permits for deployment in supplementary initiatives such as with cross-
domain transfer that has already gained NSA approval. 
While VMware offers different versions of Elastic Sky X (ESX) this thesis covers 
deployment of such utilizing the Enterprise edition.  Consideration was given based on 
several key requirements: 
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• Need for a network that can support thousands of systems. 
• Service console allows for command line operations and running script. 
• Allocates space for additional components. 
• Compatibility with different vendor models. 
• Centralized Virtual Machine (VM) management. 
• Built in firewall that protects service console. 
• Supports booting for a storage area network (SAN) providing quick 
recovery time for affected VM (Siebert, 2009, p. 29–30). 
In determining server hardware requirements VMware offers a Capacity Planner 
toolkit for business partners intending to purchase VM applicable services.  In lieu of 
this, Tables 3 through 5 provides estimations based on the set rules derived from the 
VMware implementation guide (Siebert, 2009, p. 48–65). 
• The number of required host servers is defined by CPU and memory 
requirements. 
• CPU activity determines number of VMs allocated per ESX host.  Rule of 
thumb – single core supports four single-vCPU VMs. 
• Advanced memory feature in ESX reduces amount of physical host 
memory utilized prevents added performance degradation. 
• Hard disk usage should be based on the amount used excluding free space. 
• ESX currently supports Intel and Broadcom network interface card (NIC).  
Consider four-port adapter for greater flexibility and reliability. 
• iSCSI as a network storage is the preferred cheaper alternative. 
• Network attached storage (NAS) provides an additional fault network 
storage option comparable to iSCSI. 
• VMware Vsphere 4.0 allows for complete deployment versus individual 
server management (Troy & Halmke, 2010, p. 3). 
• Redundant Array of Independent (or Inexpensive) Disks (RAID) supports 
fault tolerance for shared data and applications. RAID 1 utilized for disk 
mirroring or data backup.  RAID 5 incorporates distributed parity with 
disk striping (Dean, 2006, p. 689–693). 
• Storage Area Networks (SANs) are storage devices that support direct 
communication between entities (Dean, 2006, p. 694–696). 
More specific guidelines can be found in a report released by Joseph Greenfield, 
August 31, 2010. 
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Manufacturer Dell 
Model PowerEdge R710 
Size 2U Bracket for Xeon 56xx Processor and 8 
2.5” hard drives 
CPU (2) Intel Xeon E5620 2.4GHz, 12M Cache, 
Turbo, HT, 1066MHz max memory 
Memory (RAM) (8x8GB) 64GB memory, 1333MHz dual 
ranked RDIMMs for 2 processors, 
optimized, advanced ECC  
Primary Hard Disks (OS) (2) 72GB 15K RPM SAS Hot Plug Hard 
Drive, RAID 1 
Secondary Hard Disks (Virtual Machines) (6) 500GB 7.2K RPM SAS 2.5” Hot Plug 
Hard Drive, RAID 5 
Power Supply High Output 870W Redundant Power 
Supply 
Network Adapters (2) Onboard GB Ethernet NIC, Broadcom 
5709 Dual Port 1GB Ethernet NIC with 
TOE PCIe-4 
Additional NIC (2) Broadcom 5709 Dual Port 1 GB 
Ethernet NIC 













CPU Intel Xeon X3440, 2.53GHz, 8M Cache, 
Turbo, HT 
Memory (RAM) (4x2GB) 8GB memory, 1333MHz, Dual 
Ranked UDIMM 
Hard Disks (2) 600GB 15K RPM Serial-Attached SCSI 
6Gbps 2.5” Hot Plug, RAID 1 
Network Adapters (2) Onboard GB Ethernet NIC, Broadcom 
5709 Dual Port 1GB Ethernet NIC with 
TOE PCIe-4  
Optical Drive SATA DVD-ROM 
Table 4.   Control Server Specifications (From Greenfield, 2010) 
 
Rack Hardware 32U Server Rack 
 (3) 3U Uninterruptible Power Supplies 
 2U Managed Switch 
 1U Control Server 
 (10) 2U Virtualization Server 
Additional Hardware 8TB Netgear Ready NAS 
Software MSDNAA Developers 
 VMware vSphere 4 
Table 5.   Honeynet Hardware Requirements (From Greenfield, 2010) 
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D. HONEYNET CONFIGURATION 
Figure 18 illustrates the proposed logical topology for the CCW laboratory.  Here 
logical topology references the data transmission methodology between nodes.  In a bus 
topology, signal travels from one network device to all other network devices whereas in 
a ring topology signals follow a circular path between the sender and receiver. 
 
 








Figure 19 depicts a typical Honeynet comprised of a Host Operating System (OS) 
such as Linux or Windows and three separate network interfaces.  Implementation of the 
Honeynet is accomplished using VMware, a commercially available software program.  
A bridge interface is used to connect the different network segments for two reasons.  
Bridges are protocol independent therefore data transfers a more rapid rate.   Bridges also 
have a database to filter out unwanted frames that in turn improves overall system 
performance. 
 








Figure 20 further goes on to illustrate a Honeynet uploaded with the Honeywall 
compact disc read only memory (CDROM) comprised of both virtual and real 
Honeypots.  It shows the Honeynet environment enclosed in a detached environment that 
when in bridge mode has the capability to emulate a legitimate network system running 
application and services that are accessible to a potential hacker.  The hacker or attacker 
in this case is any individual that utilizes either opportunistic or targeted approach to 
exploit vulnerabilities in a system.  Opportunistic attacks in this case are incidents in 
which an attacker has a general idea of what or whom he wants to attack.  Targeted 
attacks on the other hand are attacks in which the attacker specifically chooses his target 
and does not give up until his target is compromised (Dhajani, Rios, & Hardin, 2009, p. 
223–224). 
Based on the construct, the attacker would have the ability to hack into the hybrid 
Honeynet and unbeknownst to the hacker, it gives the administrator access to 
methodologies used by the hacker to enter into the isolated network system.  A key point 
to be made is that this entire evolution can transpire without having to worry about the 
security risks or potential compromise of the entire system. 
 
Figure 20.   Hybrid Virtual Honeynet (From Honeynet Project, November 2004) 
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